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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he became the fifth consecutive British prime minister to occupy the position over a six-year span.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this signified unprecedented political turmoil. So how might we describe what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth premier in 24 months – with three in the last ten months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not witnessed for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Essential context: ever since Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three warring blocs – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the nation faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the following day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job virtually unworkable.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it gently, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team announced the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron honored his word – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s key policy would be frozen until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back no-confidence motions proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the government should survive those ballots, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.

An alternative might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Polls suggest the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that cultural shift will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the emergence of governing coalitions common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”